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Risk and Marketing Behavior: Pricing Fed Cattle on a Grid
Abstract
A seven year comparative study of grid pricing versus average pricing ofslaughter cattle was
conducted to evaluate carcass quality market signals. The primary objective of the study is to
determine if market signals sent through the grid pricing system are encouraging producers to
market on a grid and discouraging them to market by the pen. Two secondary objectives
investigate: 1) ifprice risk associated with carcass quality uncertainty affects marketing
decisions, and 2) ff a change in price risk (volatility) affects producer marketing decisions.
An EARCH-ln-Mean modeling procedure was adopted. Empirical results suggest that the grid
premium and discount structure is slowly adjusting carcass quality market signals to encourage
marketing on a grid and discourage marketing by the pen. The inclusion o_f the conditional
variance in the empirical model indicates that risk associated with carcass quality uncertainty is
a potential barrier to adoption o_f the grid pricing system by producers.

Risk and Marketing Behavior: Pricing Fed Cattle on a Grid
The beef industry continues to recover from an extended period of relatively weak
demand and declining market share for its product (Tonsor 2011 ). The beef industry has
responded by promoting production and marketing reforms along its entire supply chain. The
stated goal of these suggested reforms is to transform the beef industry into a value-based
industry. The blueprint of this initiative is outlined in an industry sponsored white paper: War on
}at released by the Value Based Marketing Task Force (VBMTF 1990).
A key component of the initiative is the call for the development of a value based pricing
system. In the early 1990s the industry began the conversion from the traditional "Grade and
Yield" pricing system for fed cattle into what is commonly referred to as grid pricing. The goal
of the beef industry's movement toward value based pricing is to improve the flow of
information from the consumer to the producer so that the industry is producing the "right
product at the right price to meet consumer demand" (Fausti et al. 201 Oa: p. 19).
The grid pricing literature (e.g., Schroeder and Graff 2000; Fausti and Qasmi 2002;
McDonald and Schroeder 2003; Johnson and Ward 2005) has investigated and discussed in great
detail the effectiveness of the grid pricing system to transmit market signals to producers with
respect to carcass quality. This literature has also discussed potential barriers to across-the-board
producer adoption of grid pricing (e.g., Fausti et al. 1998; Belasco et al. 2010). Several studies
have attempted to estimate grid market share of fed cattle slaughter volume (e.g., Schroeder et al.
2002; Muth et al. 2007; Fausti et al. 2010a) to determine the level of industry adoption of the
grid pricing system. However, up to this point, empirical evidence on if the incentive structure
of the grid pricing system (since its inception) has become a more effective signaling mechanism
with respect to carcass quality has not appeared in the literature.
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The objective of this paper is to investigate if the effectiveness of the grid pricing system
to transmit informative market signals to producers has changed over time. In this study, we
evaluate grid market signals by comparing the financial incentive structure of the grid system to
the producer's alternative of selling fed cattle by the pen at an average price.
The empirical analysis begins with two pens of cattle (1500 head each). We begin by
simulating per head weekly revenue (grid and dressed weight) for each animal and the revenue
differential for each animal (grid minus dressed weight). In the next step, weekly pen level
average per head revenue and the per head revenue differential are derived. As a result, two
data sets are created containing weekly pen level averages for per head revenue and the per head
revenue differential for a 381 week period.
The two pens differ with respect to carcass quality but individual animal carcass
attributes remained fixed over the timeframe of the study. We employ an EARCH-in-Mean
regression modeling procedure to analyze the variation in the average per head revenue
differential for the two pens. The EARCH model is uniquely suited for analyzing the empirical
issues associated with marketing risk addressed in this study. The EARCH term (Nelson 1991)
allows for producers' asymmetric response to good vs. bad news. The "Mean term" (Engle,
Lilien and Robins 1987) provides an empirical estimator to test for the possibility of a risk
premium associated with volatility.
Our empirical results indicate that the incentive to market high (low) quality cattle on a
grid (by the pen) has increased (decreased) during the timeframe covered in this study. This
finding indicates that the grid pricing system's role as a value based pricing system is
strengthening over time. Furthermore, we incorporated the model's conditional variance as an
explanatory variable and found that market risk does affect the incentive structure associated
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with the decision to market on a grid or by the pen. The incorporation of price volatility
modeling tools into the grid pricing literature reflects a contribution to the empirical literature on
marketing behavior in U.S. livestock markets.
Literature Review

Agricultural economists have investigated a number of issues pertaining to the beef industry's
value based marketing (VBM) initiative for slaughter cattle. A general discussion of this
literature can be found in Fausti et al. (2010a). The success of the value based marketing
initiative cannot be measured by a single metric. Consumer acceptance can be measured by
changes in beef demand over time (Schroeder et al. 2000), or investigated using experimental
methods (e.g., Umberger 2007). Production efficiency, with respect to carcass quality, has been
investigated in the context of technological innovation to enhance value based beef production
and marketing methods (e.g., Lusk 2007; Koontz et al. 2008).
A white paper (War on Fat) published by the Value Based Marketing Task Force
(VBMTF 1990) specifically discussed the need for an alternative pricing system to the traditional
practice of selling fed cattle at an average price by the pen. Selling fed cattle at an average price
by the pen is '.'iewed by the beef industry (VBMTF: consensus point 7) as an inefficient pricing
mechanism because it distorts market signals from the consumer to the producer (Feuz et al.
1993) with respect to carcass quality. The price signal issue arises because selling slaughter
cattle by the pen at a negotiated price per hundred weight allows pricing error to enter into the
transaction because carcass quality: a) is unknown at the time of the transaction, and b) is not
uniform across all animals in a pen. Thus, animals with desirable carcass attributes are paid the
same price per pound as animals with undesirable carcass attributes. Thus, low quality cattle are
paid a premium above their actual market value, and high quality cattle are penalized by being
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paid a price per pound below their actual market value. The implication is that producers who
sell by the pen do not receive a price signal on carcass quality differences for the animals within
a pen.
The introduction of grid pricing mechanisms (GPM) as a value-based pricing system
alternative to pen level sales reflects the beef industry's desire to improve carcass quality through
the market mechanism (Fausti et al. 1998). Grid pricing mechanisms have been touted by the
beef industry and academic researchers as a key component in the development of a value based
marketing system for fed cattle (Schroeder et al. 1998). The goal of a grid pricing system is to
provide a mechanism that rewards desirable carcass attributes and discounts undesirable carcass
attributes, thus providing a market signal that will encourage producers to improve carcass
quality.
Agricultural economists have investigated the effectiveness of GPM as a price
transmission mechanism from consumers to producers (e.g., McDonald and Schroeder 2003;
Johnson and Ward 2005 & 2006). The general consensus is that carcass weight rather than grid
premiums and discounts assigned to carcass quality attributes is still a very important component
of the GPM price signal. Johnson and Ward (2006) report that for cattle with the highest
(lowest) carcass quality sold on a grid, weight accounted for 79% (50%) of the market signal.
Furthermore, they report that grid discounts account for 20% and 49.5% of the market signal for
high quality and the low quality cattle groups in their study, respectively. Their findings are
consistent with earlier studies that have raised the issue that the GPM premium and discount
structure may act as a "barrier to adoption" of grid pricing by producers ( e.g., Fausti and Qasmi
2002).
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The goal of the VBM initiative is to transform the beef industry's production and
marketing system along the entire supply chain. To accomplish this goal, a VBM pricing system
needs to capture a dominant share of fed cattle sales. While grid marketing has increased in
importance as a pricing method for fed cattle over the last fifteen years, it has not replaced
average pricing by the pen as the dominant marketing option selected by fed cattle producers.
Fausti et al. (20 1 Oa) provides empirical estimates that grid market share of steer and heifer
slaughter has increased from the low teens in the 1 990s to approximately 45% in 2009. The
inability of the grid pricing system to capture a dominant share of fed cattle slaughter implies a
weakness in the incentive mechanism.
Conceptually, an important objective of GPM as an integral component of a value based
marketing system is to induce fed cattle producers to sell their cattle on a grid. The benefits to
producers who sell on a grid touted by the beef industry are: a) producers will be rewarded for
the above average cattle they sell on a grid, and b) producers will be given detailed information
on the quality of each individual carcass by the packer. Carcass information and the premiums
represent the grid market signal to the producer that is absent when cattle are sold at an average
price by the pen. In tum, the producer will make adjustments to the production system to
improve the carcass quality of animals sold in the future. However, there is also risk the
producer must accept. When a producer sells on a grid the producer faces uncertainty
concerning the average quality of animals being sold. This uncertainty creates a financial risk
becaus1.;

t�11.,

1..a�.Je may be of lower quality than the producer expected. The reason why this

financial ri�.k exists is because all producers have the option of selling cattle by the pen at an
average price. In this c&se, the buyer (packer) assumes the financial risk associated with carcass
quality uncertainty.
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Numerous studies have identified financial risk factors affecting the behavior of buyer
and sellers in the fed cattle market (e.g., Feuz et al. 1 995; Anderson and Zeuli 200 1 ; White et al.
2007; Belasco et al. 20 10; Fausti et al. 201 3). The Theory of Factor Price Disparity formally
addresses the financial risk issue associated with carcass quality uncertainty (Fausti and Feuz
1 995). Fausti and Feuz ( 1995) identified the economic consequences of carcass quality
uncertainty on buyer pricing decisions and seller marketing decisions. They demonstrate that
packer's will charge a risk premium when purchasing cattle by the pen due to carcass quality
uncertainty. They also hypothesize that seller risk preference combined with carcass quality
uncertainty provides a reasonable explanation for the coexistence for multiple marketing
alternatives for slaughter cattle. In a recently published article, Fausti et al. (20 1 2) demonstrate
that risk preference in conjunction with carcass quality uncertainty does contribute to the
existence of multiple marketing methods for slaughter cattle.
The key to accomplishing the beef industry's goal of having a dominant value based
pricing system is dependent on how effective the grid pricing system's incentive mechanism is at
transmitting market signals to producers. A key indicator of success would be if the incentive to
market higher quality cattle on a grid strengthens over time and the disincentive to market lower
quality cattle on a grid weakens over time. A weakening of the incentive to market lower quality
cattle by the pen at an average price relative to selling on a grid will encourage producers to
increase their use of a grid when marketing fed cattle. In tum, information of grid performance
will encourage producers to adopt value based production practices. According to Fausti et al.
( 1 998), a key metric of success for the beef industry's value based initiative is a reduction in the
"barriers to adoption" of its value based pricing system.
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Thus, a logical approach for evaluating the effectiveness of the GPM incentive
mechanism is to compare its performance as a signaling mechanism relative to the alternative
pricing methods available to producers. Evaluating market outcomes for cattle sold on a grid
relative to cattle sold on a live or dressed weight has been a common practice in the grid pricing
literature (e.g., Fausti et al. 1 998; Schroeder and Graff 2000; Anderson and Zeuli 200 1 ). Fausti
and Feuz ( 1 995) and Feuz et al. ( 1 995) suggest that the price differential between grid and
average pricing reflects the risk premium buyers (sellers) are willing to pay to accept (avoid) the
financial risk associated with carcass quality uncertainty. The empirical analysis to follow
assumes the revenue differential reflects the risk premium associated with carcass quality
uncertainty. Thus, the empirically estimated weekly revenue differential represents the weekly
market risk premium associated with carcass quality uncertainty.
Data
Carcass data on 2590 slaughter steers was collected from a retained ownership study conducted
by South Dakota State University. A random sampling procedure was employed to construct
two data sets. The first dataset, labeled "Choice" data, consists of 2/3 choice grade steers and 1 /3
select grade steers, whereas the second dataset "Select" includes 2/3 select grade steers and 1 /3
choice grade steers. 1 Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the two data sets.
Table 1. Summary Statistics: Cattle Carcass Attributes
Data Set/ Variable
Select Data Set:
HCW
QG
YG
Choice Data Set:
HCW
QG
YG

Minimum Maximum

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

1 500
1 500
1 500

7 1 8.57
2.70
2.66

74.61
0.53
0.64

478.00
1 .00
0.64

964.00
4.00
5.06

1 500
1 500
1 500

7 1 9.37
2.35
2.78

73.84
0.52
0.62

478.00
1 .00
0.64

964.00
4.00
5.06
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The carcass data were used to simulate weekly per-head market values using both a grid
pricing system and the hot weight carcass (HCW) pricing system. Summary statistics for the
weekly market simulation data were derived. Included in the summary statistics were the weekly
statistical mean (n=1500) and standard deviation for: a) per-head grid and HCW revenues, b) the
grid minus HCW differential using a "matched pairs" process, c) the standard deviation for grid
revenue and HCW revenue, and d) the weekly grid revenue standard deviation minus the HCW
standard deviation. The summary statistics data were collected for each week in the study and
used to construct the 381 week data set (April 2001 to July 2008).2 The weekly matched pair
price differential,

[If!� 0 (GridREVi -

HCWREVi)]/1500, is the variable of interest and is

denoted as RevD1 for the high and low quality grade pens. Summary statistics describing the data
can be found in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2. Summary Statistics: National Carcass Premiums and Discounts
for Slaughter Steers and Heifers ($ per hundred weight)
Variable
Choice/Select
YG 1-2
YG>5

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

381
381
381

-9.81
2.88
-18.47

4.44
0.29
0.73

Minimum Maximum
-24.87
1.89
-22.71

-2.84
4.30
-16.55

Weekly grid price per-head was determined using a calculated weekly base price and the
weekly AMS additive grid as proposed by Fausti et al. (1998). Weekly grid premium and
discount data were collected from USDA-AMS weekly report (LM_CT155): National Carcass
Premiums and Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers. The pen level HCW weekly price
data were collected from the Nebraska Weekly Direct Slaughter Cattle-Negotiated Purchases
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report (LM_CT 1 58). The reported HCW price selected is for dressed delivered steers grading
35% to 65% choice.

Table 3. Summary Statistics
Variable
Select Data Set:
GRJDREV
SDGRIDRE
HCWREV
SDHCW
DIFFREV*
DIFFSD·
Choice Data Set:
GRIDREV
SDGRIDRE
HCWREV
SDHCW
DIFFREV*
DIFFSD·

Minimum Maximum

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

38 1
381
38 1
381
381
38 1

939.54
1 06.65
944.87
98. 1 1
-5.33
8.54

1 1 5.22
1 3.58
1 1 4.9 1
1 1.93
3.66
5. 1 2

698.71
79.56
702.75
72.97
- 1 8.54
3.30

1240.62
1 55.48
1253.61
1 30. 1 6
3.20
48.40

38 1
38 1
38 1
38 1
381
38 1

963. 3 1
1 08.94
945.7 1
97. 1 1
1 7.27
1 1.83

1 1 8. 1 2
1 4.07
1 1 4.57
1 1 .82
8.37
6.01

7 14.40
81 . 1 1
703.54
72.2 1
-3.64
3.02

1 29 1 .02
1 53.94
1 1 92.50
1 28.81
42.36
36.84

"*" denotes statistically significant at the 1 % level.

Explanatory variables were selected based on potential influence on RevD1• Given that
carcass quality is being held constant over time, reported weekly AMS grid premiums and
discounts, a seasonality dummy variable, and a time trend variable were selected as explanatory
variables. Since grid premiums and discounts within the quality and yield grade categories are
highly correlated, we selected the choice/select discount, yield grade 1 -2 premium, and the yield
grade 5 discount as proxies for the grid pricing system in our empirical model. We converted the
grid discounts to positive values by reversing the sign to simplify interpretation.
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Methodology
We employ an EARCH-in-Mean regression model to analyze revenue differential variability for
the choice and select datasets. The revenue differential is defined as the pen average of the perhead matched pair revenue difference between the AMS grid and the HCW pricing alternative.
Following the price discovery literature (Ward 1 987, Feuz et al., 1 995, Fausti and Feuz, 1 995),
we consider informational disparity over cattle quality and the associated financial risk as
primary factors explaining the revenue differentials (market risk premium) between the two
marketing alternatives. The general economic relationship is defined as RevD1

f(grid

premiums, grid discounts, carcass quality risk).
Other important factors are also included, such as past revenue differentials, the potential
trend in preference for the AMS grid marketing alternative and seasonal price patterns. We
propose the follo\.\-ing regression for the revenue differential for the two data sets:

RevDt

= const +

L (/Ji RevDt-i
i=1

+ {J1 selectpt + {J2 yg2 t + {J3 ygSpt + {J4 Tt
(1)

where RevD1 , const, Rev Dr.,, selectp,, yg2,, yg5 p1 , T;, DS, and h, are the weekly revenue
differential, intercept, lagged revenue differential, the choice-select premium, the yield grade 1 -2
premium, the yield grade 5 discount, time trend, seasonal dummy and conditional variance (risk)
associated with the regression residual

q 3, respectively.

In particular, selectPt , yg21 and yg5 p1

capture the informational disparity over quality; the logarithm of h, is considered as a proxy for
risk.
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Dickey-Fuller unit root tests confirmed stationary of all relevant variables used in the
regression models. Durbin-Watson test statistics based on preliminary regression analysis
indicate the error terms

q

are auto-correlated. The Q and LM test statistics show that a

significant ARCH effect is present in the residuals of the regression. The following EARCH
(p,q) model is employed to account for the above effects.

q + L Pn°r-n = Jh, e,

(2)

n=I

ln(h,) =OJ+

I a,[Be,_, + (I e,_, 1-E I e,_, I)]

(3)

1=1

where e, - i.i.d.N (O,l).
Additionally, the EARCH model has two desirable features that are not available in the
traditional (G)ARCH model. First, the parameters in (3) are not restricted to be positive.
Second, the item in the bracket, denoted as g (e,_,) = Be,_, + (I e,_, 1-E I e1 _1 I) , can capture the
asymmetric effects of residual shocks on the conditional variance. Asymmetry exists when the
coefficient of e,_, is B+1 for "good news" e,_, > 0 and B -1 for "bad news" e,_, < 0 . In
e,
particular, B and the term I _, 1-E I e,_, I are often referred to as the sign effect and the size
effect, respectively.
Lastly, we determine the appropriate order of lags in Equations (1) through (3). For the
regression model (Equation 1), we choose L=3 lags of RevD, for the choice dataset and 4 lags
for the select dataset based on the 5% significance level. For the model of auto-correlated errors
(Equation 2), we first assume constant h, and then run the regression model with auto-correlated
errors. We remove insignificant lags from a maximum length of 13 (approximately equal to one
quarter) based on backward elimination. More specifically, we retain the first four lags for the
11

choice dataset and the third and fourth orders for the select dataset. For the EARCH model
(Equation 3), we employ the minimum number of lags while ensuring the normality of the
residual e1 • It amounts to the choice of q=9 for the choice dataset and q=5 for the select dataset.4
Using the above settings, we verify the suitability of the EGARCH-in-Mean regression
model, reported in Table 4. The respective model fits the choice dataset better than the select
dataset based on standard regression error measures (SSE, MSE, MAE , MAPE, and R2). The pvalues of the Jacque-Berra normality test are 0. 70 and 0. 75 for the choice and select datasets,
respectively. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of normality of residual e,, which confirms the
critical normality assumption of the EARCH model.

Table 4. Model Diagnostics
OBS
LogLik
SSE
MSE
MAE
MAPE
R-Sq.
SBC
AIC
AICC
J-B Test
Pr>%

Choice
378.00
-502.93
409.80
1 .08
0.75
4.76
0.98
1 1 66. 1 0
1 059.86
1 064. 1 8
0.72
0.70

Select
377.00
-551 .46
61 3.03
1 .63
0.88
43. 1 3
0.88
1 233.43
1 1 46.92
1 1 49.78
0.57
0.75

Empirical Results
The summary statistics presented in Table 3 are consistent with the empirical literature on grid
pricing. Summary statistics reflect long-run marketing outcomes for two pens of cattle holding
carcass quality attributes constant over time. Empirical evidence indicates that higher quality
12

cattle are rewarded on a grid and lower quality cattle are penalized relative to selling at an
average pnce. Regardless of cattle carcass quality, revenue variability is higher when marketing
on a grid.
The summary statistics also provide insight on the relationship between financial risk and
carcass quality uncertainty. Assume the producer is uncertain about the carcass quality of his/her
cattle and the producer owns both the choice and select pens. Summary statistics provided in
Table 3 show that for these two sets of cattle there is an average per-head revenue differential of
$23.77 when marketing above average cattle on a grid relative to selling below average cattle on
a grid ($963 .3 1 -939.54). If the producer is uncertain about the carcass quality of the cattle
he/she is selling, then this revenue differential represents the per-head financial risk the producer
faces. On the other hand, comparing revenue from selling below and above average cattle at an
average HCW price resulted in only an 84 cent HCWP per-head differential between pens. In
this case, the financial risk the producer faces is almost zero. This non-zero differential is the
result of the minimal weight difference across pens. These findings are consistent with
Anderson and Zeuli (200 1 : p. 284) who concluded that: "Errors in the seller's judgment of a pen
of cattle ' s quality can have a significant impact on grid pricing returns, while having little or no
impact on returns to live pricing.''
The EARCH-in-Mean regression model is estimated using maximum likelihood. The
results for the choice and select datasets are reported in the left and right panels of Table 5,
respectively. We analyze the regression results before presenting the EARCH model. All results
are compared between the two datasets.
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Table 5. EARCH-in-Mean Regression Results

Variable
Constant
RevD,_ 1
RevD,_ 2
RevD,_ 3

Rev� _ 4

selectp
yg 2
yg 5p
T
DS l
DS2
DS3
ARl ( p1 )

AR2( p2 )

AR3 ( p3 )
AR4( p4 )
EARCHO( w )
EARCH1 ( a1 )
EARCH2( a2 )
EARCH3( a3 )
EARCH4( a4 )
EARCH5( a5 )
EARCH6( a6 )
EARCH7( a7 )
EARCH8( a8 )
EARCH8( a9 )

e

8

Estimate
1 .880
0.06 1 9
-0.0790
0.0539
1 .562
1 .770
-0.590
0.0 1 2
0.377
0.763
0.6 1 2
-0.633
-0.242
0.040
-0.079
-0. 1 52
0.478
0.626
0.786
0.263
-0.062
0.0 1 3
0.085
-0. 1 20
0.469
-0. 1 93
-0. 1 20

Choice
Std.
Error. t-value
2. 1 73
0.87
0.030
2.05
0.028
-2.83
0.027
2.04
0.044
0.25 1
0.087
0.003
0. 1 92
0.352
0.321
0.063
0.07 1
0.070
0.05 1
0. 1 79
0. 1 37
0. 1 29
0. 1 37
0. 1 3 9
0. 146
0. 1 34
0. 1 25
0. 1 37
0. 1 1 8
0.076
0.066

3 5.60
7.06
-6.83
4.00
1 .97
2. 1 7
1 .9 1
- 1 0.00
-3 .39
0.57
- 1 .55
-0.85
3 .49
4.86
5.72
1 .89
-0.42
0.09
0.68
-0.87
3 .98
-2.53
-1 .79

prob. Estimate
4.9 1 1
0.3 868
0.0406
0.460
0.0046
0.0 1 9
0.04 1 8
-0.278
0.080
-0.485
<.000 1
<.000 1
3 .0 1 3
<.000 1
-0.992
<.000 1
0.0 1 3
0.0492
0.036
0.6 1 7
0.0303
0.0565
0.377
<.0001
0.0007
0.5656
0. 1 2 1 1
0.3965
0.0005
<.000 1
<.0001
0.0591
0.674 1
0.9259
0.4960
0.3820
<.000 1
0.01 1 3
0.0728
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-0.504
-0.306
0. 1 3 7
1 . 1 60
0.622
0.935
0.777
0.227
-

-

-

Select
Std.
Error. t-value
1 .703
2.88
1 1 .39
0.040
0.53
0.035
-7.82
0.036
2.92
0.028
0.022 -22. 1 3
1 3 .56
0.222
0.078 - 1 2.77
9.60
0.00 1
0.29
0. 1 27
3 .34
0. 1 84
2.22
0. 1 70
-

-

- 14.33
-9.54
0.68
1 0.45
5 .05
6.89
6.47
2. 1 1
-

-

-

0.03 5
0.032
0.203
0. 1 1 1
0. 1 23
0.136
0. 1 20
0. 1 08
-

-0. 1 33 0.060
-0. 1 5 8 0.03 8

-

prob.
0.0039
<.000 1
0.5934
<.000 1
0.003 5
<.000 1
<.000 1
<.000 1
<.000 1
0.7740
0.0008
0.0263

-

-

<.000 1
<.000 1
0.4985
<.0001
<.000 1
<.000 1
<.000 1
0.0350

-

-

-

-2.22 0.0267
-4. 1 8 <.000 1

Regression Results: Grid Premiums and Discounts

In Table 5, the estimated coefficient for the choice-select discount selectp, is $1.56 for the
choice dataset vs. -$0.49 for the select dataset. The choice-select discount essentially functions
as a market signal on the current revenue differential between carcasses with a higher percentage
in the level of intramuscular fat and carcasses with a lower percentage. The grid pricing
literature has documented that the quality grade price differential is the dominant carcass
characteristic explaining per-head revenue variability (e.g., Johnson and Ward 2005 & 2006).
The empirical estimates for selectp, indicates that for a one dollar increase in the choice
premium (select discount) will; a) increase the per-head revenue differential (the incentive to
market on a grid) for the choice pen by $1.56, and b) lower the per-head revenue differential (the
disincentive to market on a grid) for the select pen by $0.49. Our empirical estimates clearly
indicate that change in the choice/select spread alters the financial risk producers' face when
deciding to sell cattle on a grid or market by the pen.
Empirical estimates for the yield grade premium and discount variables indicate that they
affect the per head revenue differential ( RevD, ) for the choice and select pens. The premium
"yg2" for high yielding (boneless retail cuts) carcasses has a positive relationship with the per
head revenue differential for both the choice and select pens. As in the case of the choice/select
spread, our empirical estimates indicate that a change in "yg2" premium affects the incentive
(disincentive) to sell cattle on a grid (by the pen). For the select pen, a one dollar increase in the
"yg2" premium will decrease the per-head revenue differential discount (based on -$5.33
statistical mean for the per head revenue differential) by $3.01 to -$2.32. Thus a one dollar
increase in the "yg2" premium reduces the incentive to market the select pen at an average price.
On the other hand, for the choice pen, the incentive to market on a grid increases by $1.77.
15

These empirical estimates suggest, ceteris paribus, a $1 increase in the yg2 premium increases
the producer's incentive to market on a grid regardless of carcass quality expectations.
The final grid price variable included in the model is yield grade 5 (yg5p) and the
coefficients are negative in both the choice and the select models. A one dollar increase in the
"yg5p" discount will reduce the incentive to se11 the choice pen on a grid by $0.59 and for the
select pen, the incentive to market by the pen increases by $0.99. This implies, ceteris paribus, a
$1 increase in the yg5p premium reduces the producer's incentive to market on a grid regardless
of carcass quality expectations.
One interesting implication from our analysis above suggests that a simultaneous increase
in the choice-select discount and the yield grade 1-2 premium will send conflicting market
signals to producers of lower quality grade cattle but a positive market signal to producers of
higher quality grade cattle. This inherent conflict in the structure of the grid pricing system
appears to be a "barrier to adoption" that has not been identified in the previous literature.

Regression Results: Time Trend and Seasonality
The literature has yet to answer the question: is the incentive structure of the grid pricing system
evolving over time? The estimated time trend regression coefficients can help address this
question. From Table 5, we find that T is positive and statistically significant in both models.
This implies that during the sample period (2001-2008) the revenue differential for both the
choice and select datasets exhibited a positive trend. This suggests that the incentive to market
high and low quality cattle on the grid has strengthened over time.
In a recent article by Fausti et al. (201Oa), it is reported that grid market share of steer and
heifer slaughter volume increased from 35.8% in 2004 to 38.8% in 2008. The increase in grid
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market share of slaughter volume is consistent with our empirical finding that the incentive
mechanism for marketing on the grid has strengthened and the incentive to market by the pen has
declined during the period covered in the data. Documentation of the evolving nature of the grid
pricing system's incentive mechanism provides opportunities for additional research on this
issue.
Peel and Meyer (2002) discuss the seasonal pattern in fed cattle prices; price is lower in
the summer and higher otherwise. The revenue differential doesn't follow the same seasonal
pattern and has been discussed in the grid pricing literature. In our model, the quarterly seasonal
dummy variables (DSi : i= l to 3) is defined as O for the January through March quarter, one
otherwise. For the select dataset the third and fourth quarter coefficients are positive and
significant at the 5% level. All three seasonal dummy coefficients are positive and significant at
the 1 0% level for the choice dataset. Our seasonality estimates indicate that the incentive to
market high quality cattle in the spring, summer and fall strengthens. However, for the select
dataset, the positive coefficients indicate the incentive to market below average cattle by the pen
is reduced in the 3 rd and 4rd quarters. Therefore, the revenue differential does exhibit seasonality
and the estimates suggest the seasonal effects are stronger for high quality cattle. Our results
appear to be consistent with previous seasonal patterns reported in the literature (e.g., Fausti and
Qasmi 2002). Fausti and Qasmi find that if producers are uncertain about the quality of cattle
they are selling, the revenue differential between high and low quality cattle narrows in the
winter and spring quarters and widens in the summer and fall quarters. In contrast, we find that
seasonal effect is actually a positive shift in the incentive structure favoring the marketing option
of selling on a grid during the summer and fall.
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EARCH-in-Mean A1odel Results and Implications for Afarketing Risk
The EARCH-in-Mean model can be decomposed into five effects: the sign effect Be1 , the size
effect5 I e1

I

I e1 I , the ARCH effect a , and risk premium 8ln(h1 ) .

The sign (or asymmetry)

effect is statistically significant and negative for both datasets. A non-zero B indicates
asymmetric response of conditional variance to past shocks. The majority of the ARCH
coefficients are positive for both datasets, implying that the past negative (positive) shocks are
associated with higher (lower) conditional variance h1 given a negative O . 6
To visualize the asymmetry, the item that combines the sign and size effects
g (e,_, ) = Oel-i + (I e1 _1 1- E I e1 _1 I) is plotted as a function of the shock e1 _ 1 for the choice and
select datasets in Figure 1. The conditional variance (logarithm ) of the residuals ( conditional on
the information up to period t-1: H1_ 1 ) for the choice and select datasets increases more in
response to negative shocks to the revenue differential ( 0 -1) than to positive shocks ( 0 + 1 ).
The inference is that the volatility associated with the revenue differential is more sensitive to
negative shocks than positive shocks, as shown in the first quadrant of Figure 1. This implies the
financial consequence of increased uncertainty associated with the revenue differential is higher
for negative shocks relative to positive shocks (first vs. second quadrant).
For any particular week, the per-head revenue differential represents the market risk
premium, positive for above average quality cattle and negative for below average quality cattle.
The producer's marketing decision to sell by the pen or on the grid \Vill be determined by a
comparison of the individual seller's risk premium as determined by his/her risk preferences
relative to the market risk premium (see Fausti et al. 2012). lf there is greater uncertainty
surrounding the market risk premium (holding its expected value constant), then risk averse
sellers will increase their required risk premium to sell on a grid. Thus, ceteris paribus, there will
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be a subgroup of sellers who will shift from marketing on a grid to marketing by the pen (Fausti
et al. 20 1 2). Empirical evidence indicates both positive and negative shocks to the revenue
differential will increase the level of uncertainty associated with the market risk premium.
On a final note, our discussion of the asymmetric effect of shocks on the conditional
variance implies that the level of uncertainty associated with the market risk premium is
dependent on cattle quality (Figure l ). For the select (choice) dataset uncertainty associated with
the market risk premium is more sensitive to positive (negative) shocks relative to the choice
(select) dataset. We conclude that shocks to the market risk premium will alter risk-averse
producers' marketing decisions in a manner consistent with Fausti et al. (20 1 2):
a) A positive price shock will increase the incentive to market on a grid [e.g., if �et > 0 then
�GridRevt - �HCWRevt >OJ. A negative shock will increase the disincentive to market
on a grid. These results hold regardless of cattle quality.
b) For above average cattle, a positive shock increases the incentive to market on the grid
but it also increases the risk. In this case, the effect of the shock is dependent upon the
producer's risk preferences. A risk neutral producer will view the positive shock as an
increase in the incentive to market on a grid. A risk-averse producer's view will be
dependent upon their degree of risk aversion. On the other hand, a negative shock results
in an increase in the disincentive to market on the grid but also increases the risk. In this
case, the dual effects of a negative price shock are reinforcing. This implies that both
risk- neutral and risk-averse producers will view a negative price shock as a weakening of
the incentive to market on a grid.
c) For below average cattle, a positive shock reduces the disincentive to market on the grid
but increases risk so the effect on a producer's marketing decision is dependent on risk
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preferences. For a negative shock, the disincentive to market on the grid increases and
the risk increases. In this case, risk-neutral and risk-averse producers will view a
negative price shock as strengthening the disincentive to market on a grid.

Figure 1. Asymmetric Effects of Shocks on Risks
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The last issue to be addressed is the effect of a change in the conditional variance on the
market risk premium. Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987) introduced the ARCH-in-M model,
which allows the conditional variance to affect the mean, to show that a risk-averse investor will
demand a risk premium to hold long term bonds relative to short term bonds. In our model, we
take the logarithm of conditional variance because it is the only functional form that ensures the
normality of the ARCH residual. 7 The volatility effect on the market risk premium is captured
by (8), which is statistically significant and negative for both datasets. A simple description of 6
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is that it represents the component of the market risk premium due to the uncertainty. A proxy
for this uncertainty would be the standard deviations associated with mean values reported for
DiffRev in Table 3 for the choice and select datasets. If we assume that the conditional variance
is a proxy for the risk, the risk premium (o) associated with logarithm of h1 is statistically
significant and negative for the select and choice datasets. We interpret this result as an
indication that sellers of fed cattle are more willing to market their cattle by the pen in order to
avoid an even larger penalty on the grid when there is greater uncertainty surrounding the market
risk premium. The EARCH model confirms the view in the literature that carcass quality
uncertainty injects financial risk into the marketing decision. Thus, increased producer
uncertainty over the market risk premium renders their decision to sell cattle on a grid to be
inherently risker.

Summary
There are three pricing alternatives that producers have to select from when marketing their fed
cattle (live weight, dressed weight, and grid). The coexistence of pen level pricing systems with
the individual animal grid pricing system is an obstacle in the path of the beef industry's goal of
transforming itself into a value based production and marketing system. Selling cattle at an
average price by the pen is still very appealing to producers, who are risk-averse, or lack the
financial capital to adopt value based production technology, or lack economies of scale to gain
access to marketing outlets that offer a grid pricing alternative (see Fausti et al. 20 1 0 for
additional discussion on these issues). However, changes in the grid incentive structure can
mitigate these barriers. The empirical evidence suggests that changes in yield grade premiums
are more effective in shifting the incentive structure in the direction that is more favorable for
21

marketing on a grid than changes in the select/choice discount for below average quality grade
cattle.
The empirical evidence clearly shows how the financial risk of carcass quality
uncertainty is injected into producer marketing decisions with respect to selling on a grid versus
selling by the pen at an average price. An equally important contribution to the literature is the
analysis of how producers react to shocks to the grid incentive mechanism. Evidence suggests
that negative shocks reduce the incentive to market on a grid and increase the incentive to market
by the pen at an average price. Thus, the financial risk associated with shocks will continue to
affect producer marketing decisions and remain a barrier to adoption. However, the adoption of
VBM production and marketing technology does offer producers a tool to mitigate their
exposure to this type of financial risk.
Finally, empirical results suggest that the grid premium and discount structure is slowly
adjusting in a manner that encourages marketing on a grid and discourages marketing by the pen
at an average price. If this trend continues, grid market share of steer and heifer slaughter
volume should increase in the future.
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Footnotes
I

Additional information on these data sets can be found in Fausti et al. ( 1 998).

2

We did not include AMS grid premium and discount data from October 1 996 to April 200 1

(pre mandatory livestock price reporting period) due a recent study by Fausti et al. (20 1 0b). This
study suggests that AMS publicly reported weekly grid premium and discount data may have
been influenced by sample selection bias.
3

Conditional variance h1 is defined precisely by the EARCH model in Equations (2) and (3).

The conditional variance reflects volatility in the per-head revenue differential i.e., the price
incentive to market on a grid. The conditional variance is the proxy for financial risk associated
with that incentive.
4

We also estimated the same model with an added EGARCH term. We find that the GARCH

term is not statistically significant regardless of lag length. Therefore, we choose the EARCH-in
Mean model, instead of EGARCH-in-Mean modeling procedure.
5

Here we fix the magnitude of the size effect to be " 1 ", instead of a multiplication of

( I e1 1-E I e, I ) for simp licity.
6

The expectation of the ARCH term is a * E[g (e1

)]

a * B* E(e1 I e1 > 0) . For example, ifa > 0

a negative () will result in negative value of the ARCH term when et > 0. The opposite holds
when et < 0.
7

Two other forms were examined, the linear form as in Engle, Lilien and Robins ( 1 987) and the

square-root form. Neither produces an ARCH residual that passes the normality test. In fact,
Engle, Lilien and Robins ( 1 987) find that the log-linear form is preferred to the linear form in
their empirical test.

26

